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There are strong theoretical and empirical underpinnings for answering YES to the debate 
question which I intend to outline here.  
According to the gender equity theory, the very low fertility levels displayed in 
many countries of the developed world in the last decades are the result of the 
incoherence between a high level of gender equity in individual-oriented social 
institutions such as the educational system and the labor market and a low or at best 
moderate level of gender equity in family-oriented institutions, most importantly the 
family itself (McDonald 2000a, 2000b). In modern societies, women’s opportunities are 
nearly equivalent with those of men in education and paid employment. These 
opportunities however, become severely limited by having children as also domestic 
tasks multiply and women end up doing nearly all household work and childcare 
themselves. They will choose then to restrict the number of children they have to an 
extent which leaves fertility at a very low level in a society in the long run.  
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As argued by McDonald, the more traditional a society’s family system is, the 
greater is the incoherence between the social institutions in terms of the level of gender 
equity, and the lower is fertility, as modern and highly effective contraceptives made 
childbearing increasingly a choice of women. In fact, there seems to be a strong 
correlation between attitudes towards traditional gender roles in a society and birth rates 
(OECD 2005). Based on the results of an opinion poll on attitudes towards gender 
equality
2 conducted in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the countries 
involved can be sorted into two main categories: (i) those with strongly or moderately in 
favor toward gender equality and (ii) those with less favorable attitudes. Countries in the 
first group (Northern Europe, North-America) display comparatively high fertility (TFR 
of 1.5 and above), while birth rates are low (TFR below 1.4) in the other group (Southern 
Europe, Central-Eastern Europe) where almost half of the respondents favored traditional 
gender roles. This indicates that in modern societies, negative attitudes towards gender 
equality make it difficult for men and women to combine family life with education and 
gainful employment and this reduces fertility, as suggested in the gender equity theory. 
But let us take a closer look at the family itself to see whether gender equality influences 
fertility at the micro level. 
In a study based on data extracted from the Swedish Family and Fertility Survey 
covering the period between the 1970s and early 1990s, I showed that the propensity to 
have the second child was 15 per cent higher in families where the father took parental 
leave with the first child compared to couples where only the mother used the leave (Oláh 
2003). Considering father’s parental-leave use as a direct measure of gender equality, 
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while controlling for a number of factors previously shown to influence fertility
3, this 
finding suggests that a higher level of gender equality in couple relationships may 
increase fertility, as argued by McDonald. Given the relatively small sample size, it was 
not possible to distinguish by the length of the leave used by the fathers in my study, 
unlike in a more recent report based on Swedish register data focusing on the 1990s
4 
(Duvander and Andersson 2004). Similarly to my findings, the latter analysis showed 
higher propensity to have a second and a third child in families with more engaged 
fathers compared to couples where the father did not take parental leave with the previous 
child. In fact, the intensity to have a next child increased as the share of paternity leave 
increased across the groups up to a level of 25% of the father’s income being covered by 
the parental benefit in the two years following a birth. For the latter group the intensity 
declined which may reflect the negative impact of this non-normative gender-role 
behavior given that childcare is still considered to be mainly women’s domain.  
The level of gender equality in the family is also connected to education as more 
highly educated women manage better in the bargaining about the division of domestic 
responsibilities than do less educated women (Roman 1999). This suggests that 
childbearing propensity is also higher for the more highly educated, and this is the pattern 
shown in my study
5 (Oláh 2003). Highly educated parents are more likely to share 
childcare responsibilities more equally as has been demonstrated in other studies 
(Sundström and Duvander 2002, Nyman and Petterson 2003). Their results showed that 
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compared to the average for women with the same education), union order as fixed covariates, and marital 
status, policy period, educational attainment and employment status as time-varying covariates. Age of the 
first child was the time variable. 
4 Here information on the percentage of the father’s income covered by the parental benefit was used  
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(i) fathers are less likely to use parental leave among low earner couples who are also 
more often low educated, (ii) more educated mothers have stronger work orientation and 
are more inclined to return to paid work earlier which would increase the length of the 
parental leave used by the father, and (iii) fathers, who are more likely to be highly 
educated themselves if the mother is highly educated, given the quite high level of 
educational homogamy for couples in Sweden, manage better in the bargaining process at 
work regarding their use of parental leave
6 as they are less vulnerable to the negative 
reactions from the employer and workmates.  
One may argue of course that the higher second-birth intensities for the more 
highly educated mothers in Sweden were simply the result of they being more efficient in 
using the so-called speed-premium
7 by spacing the next birth within the interval that 
makes them eligible for it. However, no important educational differentials were found in 
the reaction to the speed-premium by women and men born in Sweden in a recent study 
(Andersson et al. 2006). Both the rapidity in the adaptation to the new policy and the 
magnitude in the change of birth-spacing behavior was very much the same across 
educational groups. Moreover, findings indicating a positive relation between educational 
attainment and fertility were shown even for other contexts and time periods (see 
Rindfuss and Parnell 1989 for the US for the later 1970s, Hoem and Hoem 1989 for 
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studied directly. An important exception is a study by Haas and Hwang (2000) on 200 Swedish enterprises. 
They have found that employer’s / company management’s attitudes regarding male employees’ parental-
leave use have been related to the individual employee, i.e. whether he has been seen as a valuable resource 
for the enterprise, in about one-third of the companies studied. Such requests from highly educated men, 
unlike those from employees in lower positions, have been positively met, especially upon agreement on 
the employee’s availability online and for meetings. In other companies (i.e. the rest of the sample), 
attitudes towards fathers’ uptake of  parental leave were either generally negative or neutral. 
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Sweden for the 1970s and 1980s, Kravdal 1992 for Norway and the US for the 1970s and 
1980s) which give further support for the gender equality argument
8.      
As discussed in connection with education, the division of household work is an 
important aspect of gender equality which was shown to influence fertility. In my 
analysis based on data extracted from the Hungarian Family and Fertility Survey I found 
the highest propensity to have a second child for couples who shared domestic tasks 
equally, followed by couples where the woman did most in the home but the man also 
helped (Oláh 2003)
9. This is interesting as Hungary scored high on traditional gender-role 
attitudes
10 in the ISSP opinion poll discussed before, and men were not expected to 
engage in household work in Hungary (OECD 2005). Similar results were shown also for 
other countries with respect to couples sharing housework and childcare tasks (see Torr 
and Short 2004 for the US, Cooke 2004 for Germany, and Cooke 2003 for Italy). Thus, 
the argument that the more egalitarian division of domestic responsibilities is likely to 
increase fertility seems to have sound empirical support.    
A further aspect which is relevant to the question of our debate is the number of 
children young couples wish to have compared to their achieved fertility.  The average 
desired fertility is around two children for most European countries according to the 
recent wave of the Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS). With the exception of 
Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, less than 10 per cent of women (and 12 per cent 
                                                 
8 In fact, Kravdal mentioned specifically in his comments regarding the positive relationship between 
mothers’ education and the third-birth rate in Norway and the US by the later part of the 1970s and the 
1980s that “a higher level of participation in child care and domestic duties on the part of well-educated 
fathers… may have promoted a positive effect of education” (Kravdal 1992:475), but the data did not allow 
him to follow up on this aspect.  
9 In the model, I have controlled for the mother’s age at first birth (using relative age as in the Swedish 
analysis), marital status, policy period, educational level and employment status; the age of the first child 
was the time variable.  
10 Similarly to Swedish findings, couples who behaved deviantly with the man doing most of the household 
work had the lowest second-birth intensity across the groups. Revised version of submission #714 (reflexion) 
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of men) prefer to remain childless in European societies. Having one child only is not a 
popular option either but in Austria
11 where more than 30 per cent of male and female 
respondents prefer to have small families (Federal Inst. for Population Research and 
Robert Bosch Foundation 2005). Hence, if fertility desires would be realized, Europe 
would not have a problem with long-term below-replacement fertility, but she has. This 
indicates that there are obstacles for people’s fertility desires being realized, and the low 
level of gender equality in the family is likely to be such an obstacle. 
Summing up the arguments to answer ‘YES’ to the question in this debate: the 
dual-earner family is here to stay, thus it should be made possible to reconcile family and 
paid work for both women and men. Pushing for gender equality seems to be the way to 
increase fertility rates  from the current extremely low levels, which also have 
implications for the economy in our societies. The consequence of low fertility in the 
long run is a declining and at the same time ageing population. This in turn may lead to 
sharp falls in labor supply in the near future, which will suppress economic growth and 
thereby jeopardize the future of the welfare state. Therefore we should act, while we still 
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